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- U.S. Supreme Court Again Addresses Punitive Damages.
In Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (Feb. 20, 2007), the United States Supreme Court addressed the question whether a jury may award punitive damages to punish a defendant for injuries it has inflicted on persons not party to the lawsuit. Plaintiff sued the defendant cigarette manufacturer, alleging that its conduct knowingly and falsely led her husband, who had died as a result of smoking related injuries, to believe that smoking was safe. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $821,000 and punitive damages of $79.5 million, a ratio of nearly 100 to 1. In making his closing argument to the jury, plaintiff’s attorney urged the jury to “think about how many other [victims of smoking] in the past 40 years of the State of Oregon there have been.” By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process clause of the United States Constitution “forbids a state to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that is inflicted upon non-parties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that is inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation.” Because the Court reversed the award on due process grounds, it did not address the “grossly excessive” issue raised by the 100 to 1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. The dissenting justices noted that, under prior Supreme Court jurisprudence, the reprehensibility of conduct is a proper basis for assessing punitive damages, and further noted that one important aspect of reprehensibility is the extent to which persons in addition to the plaintiffs were harmed by the conduct of the defendant.
- Connecticut Supreme Court Approves Claim For Spoliation Of Evidence.
In Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 905 A.2d 1165 (Oct. 3, 2006), the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized an independent cause of action against a party that has destroyed evidence which the first party needed to establish a separate cause of action. Here, the plaintiff was injured at a Home Depot store by a ladder manufactured by the defendant. Despite plaintiff’s request to the Home Depot store to preserve the ladder so that he could examine it, the Home Depot store destroyed the ladder after the defendant manufacturer’s expert examined it. The court held that this set of facts should be actionable, and described the essential elements of a claim for intentional spoliation of evidence as follows: (i) the defendant has knowledge of a pending or impending civil action involving the plaintiff; (ii) the defendant destroys the evidence; (iii) with the intent to deprive the plaintiff of the cause of action; (iv) the destruction renders the plaintiff unable to establish a prima facie case; and (v) the plaintiff suffers damages as a result.
- Tennessee Reverses Punitive Award And Finding Of Emotional Distress.
In Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation, et al., No. M2005-01768-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3813655 (Tenn. App. Dec. 27, 2006), the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed a jury verdict for plaintiff awarding compensatory, emotional distress and punitive damages for the death of a child in a car accident. The court held that punitive damages were inappropriate where the evidence demonstrated that the defendants’ minivan seats, which had failed causing the fatal injury, exceeded the standards set by the federal government. The court observed that a Tennessee statute creates a rebuttable presumption that compliance with applicable regulations demonstrates that the product is not in an unreasonably dangerous condition. Although the court recognized that the jury was persuaded that the presumption had been rebutted, and therefore upheld the jury’s finding of liability, the court nevertheless concluded that punitive damages were not appropriate where regulatory standards had been met. The court also reversed the award for emotional distress given to the mother for having witnessed the death of her child, because she provided no expert testimony to support her claim that she suffered sufficient emotional distress to be compensable by damages.
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