

No. 03-101

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

GALE NORTON,
Secretary of the Interior, et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

SOUTHERN UTAH
WILDERNESS ALLIANCE, et al.,
Respondents.

**On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Tenth Circuit**

**BRIEF OF *AMICI CURIAE* PROFESSORS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS SOUTHERN
UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE, ET AL.**

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INTEREST OF *AMICI*

The professors of law listed in the appendix, each of whom teaches and conducts research in the fields of administrative and/or environmental law, submit this brief *amicus curiae* in support of the respondents Southern Utah Wilderness Society, *et al.*¹ The *amici* have substantial expertise relevant to the questions of administrative law presented in this case, and strong professional interests in the development of legal rules that promote agency fidelity to public policies established by law and that assure fair and equitable access to the courts for persons whose interests are injured by agency misconduct.

This case raises a fundamental issue of administrative law: whether the federal courts have jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to review inaction by a federal agency when that inaction violates a nondiscretionary statutory mandate imposed by Congress. That question goes to the heart of modern administrative law, which is fundamentally concerned with the relationships among agencies, other institutions of government, and the public, and in particular with the legal principles that constrain and direct the actions of administrative agencies to ensure their fidelity to policies established by law. *Amici* submit this brief to provide the Court with a fuller understanding of the principles of administrative law that properly should inform this Court’s decision.

¹ Counsel for the parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party in this case authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity, other than *amici* or their counsel, made a monetary contribution to the brief’s preparation or submission.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Judicial review is central to the rule of law, serving as an essential check on administrative action that disregards legislative mandates or constitutional rights. For this reason, the courts have long recognized a presumption in favor of providing judicial review of executive action. The modern understanding of administrative law recognizes that agency inaction that is in dereliction of a statutory command can inflict injury on legally-protected interests that is as damaging as affirmative agency action taken in violation of statutory limitations. For these reasons, the APA explicitly provides for judicial review of an agency's failure to act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 702.

The position taken by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") in this case – that the federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear claims that federal agencies have failed to carry out legislative mandates except in the most limited circumstances – conflicts with these basic principles of modern administrative law. BLM's legal argument misreads the relevant language of the APA, and disregards Congress's clear intent that the APA "afford a remedy for every legal wrong." S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 7 (1945). BLM's position would, if accepted by this Court, create a significant gap in the ability of the courts to constrain executive agencies to follow the will of Congress. It would also establish a fundamental imbalance in the ability of persons whose interests are injured by federal agency misconduct to obtain a remedy, improperly favoring those who are regulated directly by agency action while disfavoring the beneficiaries of statutory mandates established to protect and promote specific public interests. Both outcomes would undermine the rule of law in this country.

ARGUMENT

I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION IS ESSENTIAL TO THE RULE OF LAW

A. Judicial Review Serves Important Societal Interests in Promoting Fidelity to Congressional Purposes, Guarding Against Undue Influence of Private Interests Over the Regulatory Process, and Supporting Public Confidence in Government

Judicial review of agency action serves important societal purposes, broadly embodied in the notion of the rule of law.² Judicial review promotes fidelity by agencies to statutory directives and guards against undue influence by private interests in the regulatory process.³ The lack of normal safeguards of electoral accountability and separation of powers for administrative agencies makes concerns regarding factional influence over governmental processes and disregard of democratically-reached public policies especially intense in the administrative context.⁴ The availability of judicial review for persons injured by agency action moderates these concerns, serving as an

² See LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320-27 (1965); Richard Stewart & Cass Sunstein, *Public Programs and Private Rights*, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1203 (1982) (discussing functions of rule of law).

³ See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.11 (4th ed. 2002) (judicial review furthers two related goals: “(1) reduction of the risk that agencies will engage in lawless conduct and (2) reduction of the risk that agency decisionmaking will be infected by factional bias”); Henry P. Monaghan, *Marbury and the Administrative State*, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33 (1983).

⁴ Cass R. Sunstein, *Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney*, 52 U.CHI. L. REV. 653, 655 (1985).

essential constraint upon the exercise of arbitrary or venal power by administrative agencies.⁵

The role of judicial review in assuring the rule of law is deeply rooted in our governmental system. Justice Thomas has observed: “Our constitutional structure contemplates judicial review as a check on administrative action that is in disregard of legislative mandates or constitutional rights.” *Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Health Care, Inc.*, 529 U.S. 1, 44 (Thomas, J., dissenting).⁶ As this Court has noted, Chief Justice Marshall “long ago captured the essential idea” when he observed that “‘a government of laws and of principle’” could not leave persons injured by unlawful official conduct without a remedy. *Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno*, 515 U.S. 417, 424 (1995), quoting *United States v. Nourse*, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 8, 28-29 (1835). In the largest sense, judicial review “provides, and has always provided, vital legitimacy to actions of administrative agencies in the American system of government.” Peter H.A. Lehner, Note, *Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction*, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 627 (1983).

⁵ See Sunstein, *Reviewing Agency Inaction*, *supra*, at 656 (noting that the prospect of review increases the likelihood of fidelity to substantive and procedural norms during the decision making process long before judicial review is invoked).

⁶ See S. BREYER, R. STEWART, C. SUNSTEIN & M. SPITZER, *ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY* 985 (5th ed. 2002) (“[T]he presumption of review owes its source to considerations of accountability and legislative supremacy, ideas embodied in article I, and also to rule of law considerations, embodied in the due process clause. . . .”).

B. Administrative Law Recognizes a Broad Presumption That Judicial Review of Agency Conduct is Available

For these reasons, the federal courts have historically adopted a presumption in favor of the availability of judicial review of agency action. The Court concluded in *Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner*, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), that “a survey of our cases shows that judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.” Thus, “federal judges traditionally proceed from the ‘strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review.’” *Gutierrez de Martinez, supra*, 515 U.S. at 424 (quoting *Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians*, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)).

The Court recognized in *Abbott Laboratories* that the general expectation in administrative law that judicial review be available was “reinforced” by the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act. 387 U.S. at 140. The APA “embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action.’” *Id.* (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). The framers of the APA designed the judicial review provisions of the Act to “afford a remedy for every legal wrong,” S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 7 (1945) (hereinafter S. Rep.), *reprinted in* ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 79TH CONGRESS at 193 (1946) (hereinafter LEG. HIS.); H.R. Rep. No. 79-1980, at 17 (1946) (hereinafter H.R. Rep.), *reprinted in* LEG. HIS. at 251,⁷ and defined “agency action” broadly to “assure

⁷ For convenience, references to the legislative history of the APA are hereinafter made to the published volume, and cited as LEG. HIS.

the complete coverage of every form of agency power, proceeding, action or inaction.” LEG. HIS. at 198 (S. Rep.); 255 (H.R. Rep.). This Court has accordingly recognized that the Act “is meant to cover comprehensively every manner in which an agency may exercise its power,” *Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.*, 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001), and emphasized that the Act’s “‘generous review provisions’ must be given a ‘hospitable’ interpretation.” *Abbott Laboratories, supra*, 387 U.S. at 141. Thus, “only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.” *Id.*⁸

II. AN AGENCY’S FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT A STATUTORY MANDATE THREATENS THE RULE OF LAW NO LESS THAN AFFIRMATIVE AGENCY ACTION THAT VIOLATES LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

A. The Concerns Supporting the Presumptive Availability of Judicial Review for Agency Action Apply With Equal Force to Agency Inaction in Dereliction of Statutory Mandates

From its earliest days, this Court has recognized that judicial relief is warranted where an executive officer has

⁸ While the Act creates exceptions to the presumption of reviewability, the exceptions are narrow: judicial review of an agency’s final action will be denied only where it is (1) expressly precluded by statute or (2) committed by law to an agency’s discretion. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). See *Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe*, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (exception for action “committed to agency discretion” applicable only in “rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply”) (internal quotations omitted). BLM does not invoke either exception in this case.

failed to perform a mandatory duty. Faced with a request for mandamus to compel an administrative action – delivery of executed commissions of appointment to office – alleged to have been withheld unlawfully by the Secretary of State, Justice Marshall observed in *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” *Id.* at 163. That basic right to a judicial remedy extends, as Justice Marshall made resoundingly clear in *Marbury*, to administrative inaction that impairs legal rights, no matter how lofty the public officer may be: “[W]here a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.” *Id.* at 166.

The need for the courts to provide a remedy for unlawful administrative defaults has become more compelling, and better recognized, as the modern administrative state has evolved. The development of modern administrative law can be traced in significant measure from the recognition that statutorily-granted rights have equal entitlement to judicial protection as traditional common-law rights.⁹ The pre-New Deal understanding of the role of the courts in reviewing administrative conduct was based on the assumptions that market ordering within the constraints of the common law formed a natural baseline, and that the

⁹ Indeed, “[t]he rise of the modern regulatory state results in large part from an understanding that government ‘inaction’ is itself a decision and may have serious adverse consequences for affected citizens.” Sunstein, *Reviewing Agency Inaction*, *supra*, at 683.

courts should accordingly be vigilant to protect traditional private rights from improper government intervention.¹⁰ This traditional paradigm constrained the courts' willingness to respond to claims of agency failure to act: the presumption in favor of the existing status quo amounted to a "one-way ratchet" imposing legally enforceable restraints on government regulation, but not on inaction, while the beneficiaries of such regulation, lacking traditional liberty or property interests, were relegated to the political process when agencies failed to implement the law.¹¹

Modern administrative law, developed in parallel with the rise of the modern regulatory state, has decisively rejected this limited view of courts' role in vindicating statutorily-granted rights. As recognized by the courts and legal scholars for nearly three-quarters of a century, common-law rights and statutory rights equally reflect policy judgments by government decision makers. Thus, nothing about the common law basis of a right endows it with higher status than a right the legislature has found appropriate to bestow.¹² From early in the 20th Century, this Court's decisions recognized that common law ordering is

¹⁰ See Cass R. Sunstein, *Constitutionalism After the New Deal*, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 474-75, 501-03 (1987).

¹¹ Sunstein, *Reviewing Agency Inaction*, *supra*, at 666-67.

¹² See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, *Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication*, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1204 n.18 (2003) ("The New Deal Court's rejection of *Lochner* recognized the artificiality of a privileged legal status quo. In validating the modern regulatory state, the New Deal Court acknowledged the parity of targets and beneficiaries of regulation. . . . Only if the enforcement of contract, property, and trespass laws is ignored can the economics of 'laissez-faire' be understood to reflect the absence of governmental intervention.").

not a natural status quo, and that both action and inaction reflect government choices. *West Coast Hotel v. Parrish*, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (suggesting that in the absence of minimum wage laws community relief programs would “provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers”); *Miller v. Schoene*, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (“It would have been none the less a choice if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury . . . to go on unchecked.”).

Modern administrative law reflects this understanding. Thus, for example, modern procedural due process doctrine recognizes that statutorily-granted interests, no less than traditional common-law rights, may constitute property subject to constitutional protections. *See Roth v. Board of Regents*, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Similarly, this Court’s standing decisions have dispensed with any requirement that a plaintiff possess a “legal right” in favor of a looser requirement that the plaintiff suffer actual injury that is “arguably within the zone of interests protected by a statute.” *See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp*, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). The need for the modern judiciary to be sensitive to the vindication of statutorily-granted rights has been expressed eloquently by Justice Kennedy:

As Government programs and policies become more complex and farreaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition. Modern litigation has progressed far from the paradigm of *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), or *Ogden* seeking an injunction to halt *Gibbons’* steamboat operations, *Gibbons v. Ogden*, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains

of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before. . . .

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J. concurring).

The modern understanding that the common law does not form a natural baseline, and that statutorily-conferred rights are as deserving of judicial protection as common law-based rights, compels recognition that agency *inaction* in dereliction of a statutory mandate is as threatening to legally-protected interests as agency *action* that violates statutory requirements. Just as holders of common law rights may find their interests injured by governmental regulation that alters the pre-existing status quo, the holders of statutorily-granted rights are vulnerable to an agency's failure to act that leaves intact a harmful status quo. The very establishment of statutory programs, and the creation of agencies to administer them, reflect Congress's recognition that interests not recognized by the common law deserve governmental protection, and the failure of an agency to implement a Congressional command directly harms those statutorily-protected interests.¹³ Nonimplementation of a statutory mandate intended to promote societal interests in health and welfare, for example, can result in the public's continued exposure to pollutants, safety hazards, unfair trade practices, or other evils that Congress sought to eliminate, or in the degradation of lands held by law as a resource for public use and enjoyment. Nonimplementation also erodes faith in the legal system, undermining government legitimacy.¹⁴

¹³ Sunstein, *Reviewing Agency Inaction*, *supra*, at 630.

¹⁴ See Lehner, *Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction*, *supra*, at 630.

For these reasons, as Justice Frankfurter recognized in *Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States*, 307 U.S. 125, 140-42 (1939), the distinction between inaction and action in the context of modern administrative law “is as unilluminating and mischief-making a distinction as the outmoded line between ‘nonfeasance’ and ‘malfeasance.’” The role of judicial review in promoting adherence to statutory goals, and in guarding against arbitrary decision making, is as vitally necessary with respect to agency defaults as to agency excesses.¹⁵

B. Agency Inaction Poses A Particular Threat to the Rule of Law by Defeating Congressional Policies Intended to Benefit Broad Public Interests

By threatening the accomplishment of programs adopted by Congress to benefit broad public interests, agency inaction may be particularly threatening to the rule of law. Many regulatory statutes seek to benefit interests held by a wide class of people. Indeed, a primary

¹⁵ This Court has recognized that the decision to commence enforcement proceedings has traditionally been viewed as committed to agency discretion. *Heckler v. Chaney*, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). The Court noted that such decisions are only “presumptively unreviewable,” however, *id.*, and emphasized that judicial review of agency inaction is appropriate even with respect to enforcement matters where the governing statute provides meaningful standards to restrain the agency’s discretion. *Id.* at 834. The Court’s recognition of a rebuttable presumption for enforcement discretion thus does not undercut the general principle that an agency’s failure to act is subject to review where there is “law to apply.” As the Court noted: “[I]n establishing this presumption in the APA, Congress did not set agencies free to disregard legislative direction in the statutory scheme that the agency administers.” *Id.* at 833.

justification for statutory regulation is to ensure that a diffuse public interest is served, for example, by providing a public good.¹⁶ But the very diffuseness of the public interest often renders beneficiaries less politically influential than those whom the statute regulates. Individual regulated parties tend to feel the burdens of regulation more sharply than individual beneficiaries feel the benefit. Thus, political vindication of beneficiary interests may encounter serious collective action problems.¹⁷ Such problems include free-rider issues: when the benefit of a statute is generally available no individual beneficiary may be motivated to defend it, preferring instead to “free-ride” on the effort of other beneficiaries.¹⁸ Moreover, advocates of broadly-shared interests may face serious transaction costs, in identifying like-minded individuals, for example, and convincing them to pursue concerted political action.¹⁹ By contrast, regulated parties may be smaller in number, be more familiar with each other by virtue of engaging in the same regulated activity, and feel regulatory burdens more acutely.²⁰ Moreover, regulated parties may have far superior financial resources to bring to bear on regulatory processes affecting their economic

¹⁶ See, e.g., BREYER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 7 (5th ed. 2002).

¹⁷ See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 16.11 (4th ed. 2002).

¹⁸ See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, *Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model*, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 231 n.44 (1986); E. Donald Elliot, *et al.*, *Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law*, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 342 (1985).

¹⁹ See, e.g., OLSON, *supra*, at 48; see also Bruce A. Ackerman, *Beyond Carolene Products*, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).

²⁰ See OLSON, *supra*, at 33-36; Macey, *supra* n.10, at 229.

interests.²¹ As a result, regulated parties often exert more effective political influence than regulatory beneficiaries.²²

The relative ineffectiveness of diffuse public interests in the political process combines with “agency capture,” the tendency of regulatory agencies over time to become the servants of the interests they are ostensibly regulating, to undercut the ability of statutory beneficiaries to protect and vindicate their interests through political or administrative channels. As Professor Richard Stewart has observed, “It has become widely accepted, not only by public interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges and even by some agency members, that the comparative over-representation of regulated or client interests in the process of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.” Richard Stewart, *The Reformation of American Administrative Law*, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1713 (1975).²³

In the absence of effective judicial review for agency failures to implement a statutory mandate, the statute’s beneficiaries would thus face serious difficulty in obtaining redress, either from the agency or from the political process. Requiring citizens to return to the political

²¹ See DAVID M. DRIESEN, *THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW* 114-116 (2003) (noting that regulated industries routinely devote a portion of their revenues to hire lawyers, lobbyists and scientists to argue against strict regulation of their activities, and therefore participate very heavily in regulatory processes).

²² See, e.g., KAY SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, *ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY* 400 (1986); ROGER G. NOLL & BRUCE M. OWEN, *THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION: INTEREST GROUPS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS* 41-53 (1983).

²³ See also PIERCE, *ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE* § 16.11 (citing studies documenting capture).

process to enforce legislative victories already obtained would impose a double and unfair burden on them. Moreover, in the absence of a credible threat of judicial scrutiny at the behest of statutory beneficiaries, the tendency of an agency to skew its decision making in favor of regulated entities, who can readily obtain review of agency action affecting their interests, would be exacerbated.²⁴

C. The Administrative Procedure Act Explicitly Affords Review of Agency Inaction

Concerns about the failure of existing legal and administrative mechanisms to protect the interests of regulatory beneficiaries underlie the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act. In its 1941 report, the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure found that judicial review effectively checked agency excesses in derogation of private legal rights, but stated:

From the point of view of public policy and public interest, it is important not only that the administrator should not improperly encroach on private

²⁴ See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, *Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear*, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 768-72 (1997); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., *Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking*, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 87-88 (1995) (“[O]nce agencies know that statutory beneficiaries cannot invoke judicial enforcement of the duty to engage in reasoned decision making, agencies can safely ignore comments filed by beneficiaries. . . . All regulatory agencies will soon resemble the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) of the 1950’s.”).

right but also that he should effectively discharge his statutory obligations. Excessive favor of private interest may be as prejudicial as excessive encroachment. . . . A Federal Trade Commission may violate the legislative policy and cause harm to private interests by failing to investigate and detect unfair methods of competition as well as by overzealously condemning fair methods.

S. DOC. NO. 8, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 76 (1941). The Committee observed that judicial review at that time was rarely available to compel effective enforcement of the law by administrators, and noted that “the problem of whether the administrator’s refusal to take action is reviewable remains.” *Id.* at 86.

Some bills introduced during Congress’s consideration of the APA addressed the problem identified by the Attorney General’s Committee in only limited ways. Provisions for judicial review of agency conduct in various House bills either ignored the issue of inaction, *see* LEG. HIS. at 131-39 (H.R. 184), or offered a remedy for inaction only where an agency’s action was “short of statutory right, grant, privilege or benefit” or for an agency’s “neglect, failure, or refusal” to act upon “applications” to the agency for a rule, order, or permission. LEG. HIS. at 145-46 (H.R. 339); 154 (H.R. 1117); *see also* 176 (H.R. 1206) (judicial review provided for final decisions “rendered pursuant to the formal procedures provided herein”).

In contrast, however, the Senate bill that ultimately became the APA, S.7, took a broad approach to judicial review, in order to “afford a remedy for every legal wrong.” LEG. HIS. at 193 (S. Rep.). *See* LEG. HIS. at 192 (S. Rep.) (noting that S.7 “contains more comprehensive provisions for judicial review for the redress of any legal wrong” than a predecessor bill). The Senate bill defined “agency action”

expansively as including affirmative actions such as rules, orders, licenses, etc., and the denial of such affirmative relief. LEG. HIS. at 218 (S.7). However, to “assure the complete coverage of every form of agency power, proceeding, action, or inaction,” LEG. HIS. at 198 (S. Rep.), S.7 went farther by explicitly adding the term “*failure to act*” to the definition of agency action. LEG. HIS. at 218 (S.7) (emphasis added).²⁵ The judicial review provisions of the Senate bill incorporated the broad definition of agency action, affording a right of review to “[a]ny person suffering legal wrong because of *any* agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute.” LEG. HIS. at 222 (S.7) (emphasis added). Finally, S.7 explicitly affirmed the power of the reviewing court to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” *Id.*²⁶

²⁵ None of the other bills then under consideration before the 79th Congress, including H.R. 1203, the bill introduced in the House as a counterpart to S.7, included this term. *See generally* LEG. HIS. at 131-83 (setting forth text of House bills under consideration), 156 (H.R. 1203).

²⁶ These provisions received favorable attention in the Congressional debate preceding enactment of the APA. Senator McCarran, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee that authored the bill, emphasized the bill’s provisions for judicial review, noting that “it is something in which the American public has been and is much concerned, harkening back, if we may, to the Constitution of the United States, which sets up the judicial branch of the Government for the redress of human wrongs and for the enforcement of human rights.” LEG. HIS. at 305. Congressman Springer of Indiana placed particular emphasis on the provision empowering reviewing courts to compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, noting: “In many of those cases there has been a withholding or a long delay, and that particular feature is intended to hasten action on the part of these agencies. I feel confident each Member will approve that provision in this bill.” LEG. HIS. at 377.

The provisions of the Senate bill providing expansive judicial review were enacted unchanged in the final Administrative Procedure Act.²⁷ See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13) (definition of “agency action”); 702 (right of review); 706(1) (scope of review to compel agency action). The APA thus provided a comprehensive remedy for agency inaction, in keeping with the Congressional determination “to afford a remedy for every legal wrong.”

III. THE FEDERAL COURTS HAVE AUTHORITY UNDER THE APA TO REVIEW A FEDERAL AGENCY’S INACTION THAT BREACHES A STATUTORY DUTY WITH RESPECT TO MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC LANDS

A. BLM’s Assertion That the APA Precludes Judicial Review of Its Failure to Comply With A Mandatory Statutory Duty Misreads the Text of the APA and Contravenes Clear Congressional Intent

The Federal Land Policy and Management Act imposes a clear, mandatory duty upon the Secretary of the Interior with respect to management of federal lands identified as potential wilderness areas: “During the period of review of such areas and until Congress has determined otherwise, *the Secretary shall continue to manage such lands according to his authority under this Act and other applicable law in a manner so as not to*

²⁷ The bill enacted was a House substitute for S.7 that incorporated its terms with minor revisions and additions; the definition of “agency action” and the provisions for judicial review were substantively unchanged. See LEG. HIS. at 284, 288-89.

impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness. . . .” 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (emphases added). The Department of the Interior has adopted formal guidance interpreting what constitutes “impairment” of the suitability of wilderness study areas. See BLM, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, HANDBOOK § 8550-1, *Interim Management Policy for Lands Under Wilderness Review*. BLM’s guidance recognizes that the cross-country operation of motor vehicles impairs the wilderness values of such areas by creating new tracks and roads, and prohibits the agency from permitting such motor vehicle use within wilderness study areas except in emergencies or for official purposes. *Id.* Ch. 1.B.3, 1.B.11.

A failure by the Secretary to fulfill her affirmative duty to manage potential wilderness areas so as to maintain their suitability for preservation as wilderness constitutes a “failure to act” within the plain meaning of the APA, and is thus subject to judicial review under that Act. The Act includes “failure to act” within the definition of “agency action” subject to judicial review, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 702, and authorizes the courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” *Id.* § 706(1). The statutory duty imposed on the Secretary with respect to the management of these lands is mandatory, not discretionary, see 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (“the Secretary *shall* continue to manage . . .”), and BLM does not suggest that review is precluded by statute or that the agency’s conduct is committed to agency discretion by law. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).²⁸ Where, as here,

²⁸ Although BLM repeatedly suggests that judicial review in this case may interfere with its discretion in managing the public lands, it

(Continued on following page)

plaintiffs allege that the Secretary's conduct has breached her statutory duty under FLPMA, the federal courts plainly have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.

BLM argues, however, that the APA does not grant the courts authority to review failures by land management agencies to act except in extremely narrow circumstances. As an initial matter, BLM's suggestion that land management agencies deserve special exemption under the Act appears simply self-serving. Apart from its exemption of "matters relating to . . . public property" from notice and comment rulemaking procedures, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2), the APA does not treat land management agencies differently in any respect from other federal agencies.²⁹ Given the importance of judicial review to administrative law, this Court should be

has never claimed that management of these lands is committed to its absolute discretion by law. Nor could it; the specific, non-discretionary duty imposed by § 1782(c) of FLPMA, together with other provisions in that detailed statute, preclude any such claim. Similarly, the broad discretion exercised by agencies in enforcement, recognized by this Court in *Heckler v. Chaney*, *supra*, is not at issue here. Indeed, BLM does not rely upon *Heckler* in its argument.

²⁹ BLM repeatedly invokes this Court's decision in *Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation*, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), for the proposition that an agency's "day-to-day administration of its programs" cannot be reviewed. *See, e.g.*, Petitioners' Brief at 15. BLM misreads *Lujan*, however. In *Lujan*, the Court rejected an attempt by plaintiffs to aggregate a large number of individual actions into a single reviewable "program." The Court found that the alleged "land withdrawal program" was not an identifiable agency action that could receive "whole-sale" review. *Id.* at 891. The Court did *not*, however, suggest that the plaintiffs could not seek judicial review of the agency's conduct in these matters at all; to the contrary, it simply directed plaintiffs to bring their complaints regarding the agency's conduct in "case-by-case" challenges. *Id.* at 894. The plaintiffs here have done so, raising challenges to BLM's management of particular lands.

wary of attempts by federal agencies to carve out for themselves broad exemptions from judicial scrutiny.

More basically, however, BLM's legal argument is premised on a wishful misreading of the text of the APA, and conflicts with clear Congressional intent to afford expansive judicial review.³⁰ BLM argues, first, that the Act's definition of "agency action" must be read as limited to specific "discrete products of a focused decision making process by the agency," such as rules, orders, licenses, sanctions and relief. Petitioners' Brief at 13. Next, BLM posits that the term "failure to act" must mean a failure to take such formal agency action. Based on this syllogism, BLM argues that the relief available under § 706(1) and § 706(2) of the Act must also be perfectly symmetrical: the only actions that may be compelled under § 706(1), in BLM's view, are discrete actions that would be reviewable under § 706(2) if taken by an agency. Finally, BLM overlays this argument with the notion of finality, arguing that judicial review under either

³⁰ BLM relies for its view of Congressional intent almost exclusively upon the views expressed by the Department of Justice to the Congress as it considered the Act. *See* Petitioners' Brief at 18-25 (discussing the 1941 report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure and the post-enactment Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, while citing actual statements of Congressional committees or Congressmen only twice – once for the Senate Report's description of the Attorney General's Committee's "contribution"). While this Court has given the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act "some deference," given the role played by the Department of Justice in the legislative process, *see, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978), it cannot supersede actual evidence of Congressional intent, such as the reports of the Congressional committees who drafted the APA.

§ 706(1) or § 706(2) is limited to final, discrete agency actions that have been taken or withheld.

BLM's convoluted interpretation is contrary both to the actual text of the Act and to the legislative history. BLM's first premise reads § 551(13)'s definition of "agency action" as an exclusive listing of discrete formal acts, effectively ignoring the word "includes." As the statute's use of that word indicates, however, the definition of "agency action" in § 551(13) is inclusive and exemplary, not exclusive. See *Standard Oil of Calif. v. Federal Trade Comm'n*, 596 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1979) (§ 551(13) is "illustrative rather than exclusive"), *rev'd on other grounds*, 449 U.S. 232, 238 n.7 (1980) (agreeing with court of appeals regarding the existence of agency action, but finding it non-final). The term "agency action" was intentionally defined broadly by Congress to "assure the complete coverage of every form of agency power, proceeding, action or inaction," LEG. HIS. at 198 (S. Rep.), 255 (H.R. Rep.), in keeping with Congress's overarching resolve to "afford a remedy for every legal wrong." LEG. HIS. at 193 (S. Rep.), 251 (H.R. Rep.). As this Court has accordingly recognized, the Act "is meant to cover comprehensively every manner in which an agency may exercise its power." *Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.*, 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001) (emphasis added).

The phrase "failure to act," moreover, is not limited, as BLM suggests, to the failure to take a discrete formal action like the issuance of a rule or order. BLM treats the statutory phrase "failure to act" in § 551(13) as if it read, instead, "failure to take *such action*." In BLM's view, the statutory definition would thus read "agency action includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or the *failure to take such action*." The actual text of this provision does not link a "failure to act" to the exemplars

of affirmative agency action it lists, however, and the structure of the provision does not support any inference that it is so limited. If Congress had meant to define “failure to act” narrowly as a “failure to *take such action*,” it plainly could have done so, as it did by defining agency action to include the listed examples and “the equivalent or denial thereof.”

As discussed above, the phrase “failure to act” was added separately in the Senate bill to the definition of “agency action” used in other bills then under consideration. Given the understanding, widely accepted by the time the APA was enacted, that agency inaction can constitute an exercise of agency power fully as much as agency action, Congress’s deliberate inclusion of the term “failure to act” within the meaning of “agency action” must be read broadly to include any form of agency default that injures persons holding statutorily-protected interests. Congress in fact *declined* to enact proposed bills that would have defined “agency action” more narrowly, by omitting the term “failure to act” or by restricting judicial review to final decisions rendered pursuant to formal procedures. *See supra*, at 13-14. Indeed, one such failed bill proposed virtually the *exact* approach that BLM now wishes to read into § 551(13), permitting review only of particular final actions and agency failures to take such final actions. *See* LEG. HIS. at 154 (H.R. 1117) (restricting judicial review to “final actions, rules, or orders, or those for which there is no other adequate judicial remedy (*including the neglect, failure, or refusal of an agency to act upon any application for a rule, order, permission, or the amendment or modification thereof, within the time prescribed by law or within a reasonable time*) . . .”) (emphasis added). Congress’s decision instead to define reviewable agency action broadly to include any “failure to act” must therefore be understood as rejecting the narrow interpretation now offered by BLM.

Without BLM's restrictive, and erroneous reading of "agency action" and "failure to act," the agency's argument that the provisions of § 706(1) and (2) are narrow mirrors, providing review only of discrete formal decisions taken or withheld, falls of its own weight. Nothing in either provision, or in the Act's legislative history, supports that view. Section 706 defines the standard of review for the courts in actions under the APA. It cannot be read as limiting or otherwise governing the right to review conferred by § 702, and is simply irrelevant to the issue whether judicial review is *available*. The provisions of § 706(1) and (2) are indeed complementary, but they reflect the different functions of the courts when faced, respectively, with inaction and action. Section 706(1) specifies the scope of review for an agency's "failure to act"; its reference to "agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed" must be read as referring to that term, and it provides specific authority for the courts to remedy such a failure by compelling appropriate action to achieve compliance with a statutory command, regardless of whether such action takes the form of discrete, formal decisions. Section 706(2), by contrast, sets the scope of review for affirmative agency actions, authorizing the courts to "hold unlawful and set aside" such affirmative acts when they violate the applicable legal standard.

Finally, BLM's invocation of the finality requirement is simply misplaced. While the doctrine of finality applies to a claim for judicial review of agency inaction, the text of the APA does not support BLM's reading of § 706(1) as affording the courts authority to compel only discrete agency action that would be final if taken. It is § 704 that limits judicial review (unless otherwise provided by statute) to "final agency action." When "agency action" in that provision is read to embrace "failure to act," the plain meaning of § 704 is that the courts

may review any “*final failure to act*” (not, as BLM would have it, any “failure to take final action”). This is the construction of §§ 704 and 706(1) that the federal courts have long adopted when faced with claims of unlawful inaction or unreasonable delay on the part of a federal agency. As the court of appeals explained in this case:

Once the agency’s delay in carrying out [a mandatory duty] becomes unreasonable, or once the established statutory deadline for carrying out that duty lapses, the agency’s inaction under these circumstances is, in essence, the same as if the agency had issued a final order or rule declaring that it would not complete its legally required duty.

Pet. App. at 16a. *See also, e.g., Coalition for Sustainable Resources, Inc. v. United States Forest Service*, 259 F.3d 1244, 1251 (10th Cir. 2001); *Sierra Club v. Thomas*, 828 F.2d 783, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[I]f an agency is under an unequivocal statutory duty to act, failure to do so constitutes, in effect, an affirmative act that triggers ‘final agency action’ review.”).³¹

The recognition by the courts that an agency’s failure to act must at some point be deemed “final” is consistent with this Court’s teaching in *Abbott Laboratories* that finality is to be determined in a “pragmatic” and “flexible” manner. 387 U.S. at 149-50. Although an affirmative agency action is not considered final unless it marks the “consummation” of the agency’s decision making process,

³¹ *See also* Daniel P. Selmi, *Jurisdiction to Review Agency Inaction Under Federal Environmental Law*, 72 IND. L.J. 65, 99-101 (1996) (discussing constructive agency action); Lehner, *Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction*, *supra*, 83 COLUM. L. REV. at 652-55 (1983).

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997), an agency's failure to act may result as readily from neglect as from deliberate decision. Requiring a deliberate decision not to act before permitting judicial review would inappropriately entangle the courts in searching for agency motives on poorly-defined records. Indeed, requiring a demonstrable decision not to act before permitting judicial review would encourage agencies not to make such decisions, or at least not to document them, in order to evade judicial review. More broadly, it would preclude judicial review altogether of agency inaction that is the product of neglect, rather than defiance, no matter how egregiously it may derogate from Congressional direction. Finally, requiring such a decision before permitting judicial review squarely collides with § 706(1)'s authorization to courts to compel agency action "unreasonably delayed." If that provision means anything, it must mean that a failure to decide, if it amounts to "unreasonable delay," can be corrected by a court. For these reasons, the courts have properly focused on whether the agency's *failure* to act is effectively final, either because it violates a statutory deadline or because it constitutes unreasonable delay.

The second element of finality, that an agency's action have concrete real-world impact, *see Bennett v. Spear, supra*, at 178 (final action is "one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow") (internal quotes omitted), is also satisfied where an agency's failure to act inflicts actual injury on statutorily-protected interests, concretely affecting the legal rights of parties holding such interests. Where an agency's failure to adhere to a statutory mandate demonstrably injures statutorily-protected interests, such as those of wilderness users in this case, that failure must be deemed final.

B. BLM's Interpretation of the APA Would Undermine Core Principles of Administrative Law, Creating a Loophole Permitting Agencies to Escape Judicial Review and Establishing an Inappropriate Double-Standard Favoring Regulated Entities Over Beneficiaries of Statutory Mandates

BLM's erroneous and restrictive interpretation of the APA would undercut principles of administrative law that are central to the notion of the rule of law. As *amici* have shown, judicial review is a critical check on lawless agency behavior, enforcing fidelity to statutory directives, deterring improper influence by private parties over agency regulatory processes, and fostering public faith in the legitimacy of government. By carving out a broad and ill-defined exemption for land management agency administration of statutory programs, BLM's interpretation of the Act would create, as the court of appeals noted, a "no-man's-land" of judicial review "in which a federal agency could f[lout] mandatory, non-discretionary duties simply because it might be able to satisfy these duties through some form of non-final action." Pet. App. 18a n.10. BLM's response can only be termed imperious: persons injured by such lawless conduct should, BLM submits, simply ask the offending agency to correct its failure to act. The agency may then, in its sole discretion, choose to respond to such a request in a manner that "could" serve as the basis for "any judicial review that may be available." Petitioners' Brief at 29; *see also id.* at 36. BLM acknowledges that an agency would be under no legal duty even to respond to such a petition. Petitioners' Brief at 29. BLM and other agencies can hardly be expected to miss the point that they may escape judicial scrutiny altogether simply by ignoring public complaints.

Moreover, by artificially constricting judicial review of agency inaction, BLM's position would re-establish a double standard, obsolete in administrative law since the New Deal era, favoring the interests of regulated parties over the interests of beneficiaries of statutory programs. As *amici* have shown, agency inaction poses particular threats to the implementation of broad public policies and to the alleviation of non-traditional harms recognized by Congress. Precluding judicial review of an agency's failure to implement a statutory mandate would leave the beneficiaries of statutory programs without a judicial remedy for agency default, and as *amici* have noted, without effective political recourse. By contrast, under BLM's theory, persons directly regulated or restricted by an agency would always have a judicial remedy: in the case at hand, for example, off-road vehicle users would have the right to challenge any final BLM action closing wilderness study areas to vehicular use, while wilderness recreationists could not similarly challenge the agency's failure to take such steps even in the face of demonstrable degradation of the wilderness values of such areas. Such a "one-way ratchet" in favor of regulated parties would exacerbate the risks of "agency capture," since agencies could ignore without risk the views of persons unable to invoke judicial review. *See* discussion *supra*, at 11-12.

C. Recognition of the Court's Authority to Review an Agency's Failure to Act That Breaches a Statutory Duty Would Not Lead to Impermissible Judicial Interference in Agency Functions

BLM asserts that this Court must adopt its restrictive position in order to avoid "improper intrusion by courts into agency activities." Petitioners' Brief at 25. BLM

invokes a landscape in which federal judges, acting under the authority of § 706(1), micro-manage every aspect of an agency's conduct, instructing agencies in "how to act" rather than compelling agencies to act.

BLM's concern about the scope of potential remedies the courts might impose is unduly hyperbolic. In fact, the federal courts have extensive experience in adjudicating claims of agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, and have shown great sensitivity to agency autonomy in crafting remedies for such claims. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, for example, the court with the most extensive involvement with administrative litigation, uses a "rule of reason" in determining when an agency action has been unreasonably delayed; the factors it weighs include the effect that expediting delayed action might have on agency activities of a higher or competing priority, as well as the nature and extent of interests prejudiced by the delay. *See, e.g., Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC*, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("TRAC"). Other courts have shown similar sensitivity to agency functions in reviewing claims of agency failures to act. *See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development*, 817 F.2d 149, 159-60 (1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J.) ("We do not see any reason why the court cannot effectively ensure HUD's future responsible exercise of discretion while at the same time preserving for the agency its discretionary options. . . . In formulating its remedy, of course, the district court may, as it has already done, seek the advice and participation of HUD."); *Estate of Smith v. Heckler*, 747 F.2d 583, 591 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting that the "court is not a 'super agency' and cannot control the specifics of how the Secretary satisfies [a statutory] duty").

Contrary to BLM's fears, the remedies entered by the courts in such cases have rarely gone beyond determining a schedule for completion of an agency's duty, *see, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC*, 627 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1980); *Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao*, 314 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 2002), or retaining jurisdiction to supervise the agency's progress. *See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. CAB*, 750 F.2d 81, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The court of appeals in the present case noted that "compelling agency action is distinct from ordering a particular outcome," Pet. App. 11a, and made clear that it was merely holding that plaintiffs' claims should be heard. Pet. App. 3a. Just as the equitable discretion of the federal courts can protect the legitimate sovereign interests of state officials subject to a federal consent decree, *see Frew v. Hawkins*, 124 S.Ct. 899, 905-06 (2004), so too the remedial discretion of the courts can prevent undue interference with federal agency functions.

In any event, BLM's concerns about the breadth of hypothetical remedies do not speak to whether federal courts possess *subject matter jurisdiction* under the APA to hear claims of agency failure to act. As the court of appeals noted, Pet. App. 14a, BLM confuses its claim of discretion over *how* to implement a statutory mandate with the actual question before this Court: whether the agency has discretion to disobey a mandatory statutory command altogether. To accord with the basic principles of the rule of law, that proposition must be rejected.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, *amici* professors of administrative and/or environmental law urge this Court to affirm the decision of the court of appeals in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

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February 17, 2004

APPENDIX

Description of Amici

Robert W. Adler is the James I. Farr Chair and Professor of Law at the Wallace Stegner Center for Land, Resources and the Environment, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. Mr. Adler has practiced and taught environmental and natural resources law for 25 years, and has published extensively in the field.

Michael D. Axline is Professor of Law, Director of Clinical Programs and Co-Director of the Environmental Law Clinic at the University of Oregon School of Law. He teaches administrative law and civil procedure, and is the author of ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS (1993).

Robert Benson is professor of law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, where for a decade he taught administrative law and now teaches international environmental law.

Ashutosh Bhagwat is Professor of Law and Associate Academic Dean at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. He writes and teaches in the areas of constitutional law and economic regulation.

John E. Bonine is Professor of Law at the University of Oregon School of Law, where he teaches administrative law, environmental law and constitutional law. He co-founded the world's first environmental law clinic, the student-run Public Interest Environmental Law Conference, and the Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide.

Rebecca Bratspies is Visiting Associate Professor of Law at Michigan State University-DCL College of Law. She is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Idaho

College of Law. She teaches property, environmental law, and administrative law.

Sande L. Buhai is a clinical professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles. Professor Buhai has served as director of the Public Interest Department since 1994. Formerly Deputy Attorney General of the State of California, from 1984-1989, Ms. Buhai also served as Executive Director of the Western Law Center for Disability Rights, from 1989-1994.

William W. Buzbee is Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law, where he teaches environmental law, administrative law, property, land use, legal methods, and seminars on advanced environmental law issues, urban environmental law, and regulatory reform.

Debra L. Donahue has been the Winston S. Howard Professor of Law at the University of Wyoming College of Law. Professor Donahue teaches public lands law, water pollution and hazardous waste law, land use law, and Indian law; she also formerly taught administrative law. Professor Donahue is the author of *The Western Range Revisited* (U. of Okla. Press 1999).

Cynthia Drew is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law, where she teaches natural resources and energy law and administrative law.

David M. Driesen is an Associate Professor at Syracuse University College of Law, teaching environmental and constitutional law.

Cynthia Farina is Professor of Law and Associate Dean of the Faculty at Cornell University, where she teaches Administrative Law, Federal Courts and a seminar in Separation of Powers. With Peter Strauss and Todd

Rakoff, she is co-author of GELLHORN & BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, and she was the co-reporter responsible for the standing section of the ABA Project on the Administrative Procedure Act.

Joseph Feller is a Professor of Law at Arizona State University where he teaches Natural Resources Law, Public Land Law, Water Law, and Property. He is the author of numerous articles on public land law, environmental law, and water law published in law reviews and scientific journals.

Roger W. Findley is the Fritz B. Burns Chair of Real Property at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles. Professor Findley coauthored CASES & MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (6th ed. 2003), and ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL (5th ed. 2000).

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